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To Have and to Be: Sex, Gender, and the Paradox of Change
Abstract
The body is one locus of control in the organization of social life, a site upon which social order is
maintained. Within that order, a fundamental structure relies upon the radical dichotomization of, on the
one hand, female and male and, on the other, femininity and masculinity: gender is understood to be an
immutable and consistent distinction which is natural to sex' and therefore to the organization of bodies.
In this paper, I take three texts which address the mutability of both sex and gender through genital
transformation. I suggest that while these texts challenge the idea that sex and gender are both fixed,
they also reinstate a precise relationship between sex and gender, that is, between femaleness and
femininity and maleness and masculinity. My main focus is on Will Self's paired novellas "Cock & Bull"
(1992), where desires and anxieties about gender mutation play out in a fictional setting. This is
complemented by Garfinkel's (1967) presentation of "Agnes," an "intersexed" person, who goes through
sex reassignment surgery, and Bornstein's "Gender Outlaw" (1994), an autobiographical work on the same
theme.
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To have and to be: Sex, gender, and the paradox of change
Katherine Sender
The body is one locus of control in the organization of social life, a site upon which
social order is maintained. Within that order, a fundamental structure relies upon the
radical dichotomization of, on the one hand, female and male and, on the other,
femininity and masculinity: gender is understood to be an immutable and consistent
distinction which is natural to sex' and therefore to the organization of bodies. In this
paper, I take three texts which address the mutability of both sex and gender through
genital transformation. I suggest that while these texts challenge the idea that sex and
gender are both fixed, they also reinstate a precise relationship between sex and gender,
that is, between femaleness and femininity and maleness and masculinity. My main focus
is on Will Self's paired novellas "Cock & Bull" (1992), where desires and anxieties about
gender mutation play out in a fictional setting. This is complemented by Garfinkel's
(1967) presentation of "Agnes," an "intersexed" person, who goes through sex
reassignment surgery, and Bornstein's "Gender Outlaw" (1994), an autobiographical
work on the same theme.
Foucault (1973, 1978) has argued that the body has been successively reined into an
increasingly organized - and organizing - system of discourses, including "demography,
biology, medicine, psychiatry, psychology, ethics, pedagogy, and political criticism"
(1978, p.33) since the eighteenth century. The consideration of the role of the body in the
social construction of gender has also been a prevailing concern in feminist theory,
including in recent works by Butler (1990, 1993), Garber (1993), and Grosz (1994),
amongst many others. Each of these authors challenge essentialized notions of the body:
for example Grosz argues that "it is not simply that the body is represented in a variety of
ways according to historical, social, and cultural exigencies while it remains basically the
same; these factors actively produce the body as a body of a determinate type" including
"culturally, sexually, racially specific bodies..." (p. x-xi, emphasis added).
In her work on cross-dressing, Garber celebrates a range of transvestite practices, arguing
that between the dichotomies of masculine and feminine, the transvestite stands as a third
figure, where "'third' is a mode of articulation, a way of describing a space of possibility"
(p. 11) which disrupts the cozy dualism of female and male, woman and man, girl and
boy, and simultaneously challenges the idea of the unified "one," who possesses a
coherent (sexual) subjectivity. From Garber's thesis, I suggest that it is precisely the
sexual indeterminacy of the clothed body which necessitates the often rigidly-enforced
distinctions of male and female attire: we need to know quickly and reliably who we are
dealing with. Enforcing an obvious sexual distinction in dress - and, by extension, the
body itself - is thus vitally important for maintaining a gender-dichotomized social order.
It remains to be seen, however, whether transgressing the binary oppositions of sex and
gender (either through cross-dressing or by changing the sexual characteristics of one's
body) necessarily constitutes political resistance to that opposition. Alternatively, these
transgressions may always be at risk of being recuperated within dominant discourses,

through medicalizing, pathologizing or moralizing them. Nevertheless, defying the norms
of sexual identification may be, for many, what allows for a tolerable, even pleasurable
existence and, further, may also lead to structural transformations which allow for
broader possibilities of individual sexual variation. Self: Spontaneous mutations of sex
and gender The baby ... was of an age (about fourteen months), when each new morning
represents nothing so much as a triumph on the part of the Continuity Department... [She]
was delighted (albeit perplexed) that the actors playing her parents seemed to have
remembered, once again, the parts assigned to them. (Self, 1992, p.157)
The child here gives voice to a knowledge which is fundamentally contested in Self's
paired novellas "Cock & Bull"; a knowledge that assumes a guaranteed continuity of the
reassuring binaries of sexual difference. Despite appearances, "the parts assigned" to
characters in the novellas are not constant; neither body parts nor social roles are reliably
fixed. The first novella, "Cock," is a story told by a stranger to the narrator on a train. It
opens with a statement that the heroine, Carol, had "always felt at some level less of a
woman when Dan was around" (p.3), establishing a problematic around the theme of
femininity and womanhood from its outset. Where Carol is insipid, spineless and lazy,
her husband Dan is "slight, sour, effete, unsure of himself' (p. 9), afraid of his own and
anyone else's sexuality; that is, he is less than a "man". Carol becomes increasingly
dissatisfied with her life with the inadequate, alcoholic Dan and so stops drinking and
starts masturbating. On one erotic self-exploration Carol finds a "frond" (p. 32) growing
around her urethra: while alarmed, her response is to ignore it and hope it will disappear,
"leaving her genitals pristine, smooth, a delight to find and find again, just as she had
been doing in the few short weeks since she had discovered the joy of wanking" (p. 39).
However, this frond develops rapidly into a penis, which Carol initially finds repulsive.
"How one becomes what one is" (Chapter 6) describes Carol's journey into phallic
potency. As her penis grows and responds to arousal by becoming erect, her personality
develops in tandem: she gains an increasing sense of empowerment in the world, and
"along with this came a velcro wrenching as the little hooks of Carol's will began to pull
away from the little restraining loops of Carol's conscience" (p.77). She begins to prefer
the company of men, and while she knows "that her penis didn't make her a man ... it did
free her a little bit more from being anything else, it did unslip those surly bonds and
surly girly locks" (p. 81). Thus Carol welcomes liberation from what is depicted as an
inevitably whining, manipulative, weak-willed but ultimately ethical (though in the most
passive conception of the word) state of femininity. The state of womanhood, as depicted
in "Cock" is one to be escaped, if at all possible.
Carol increasingly enjoys her developing penis, prancing and posturing before a mirror.
She begins to perceive her mutation as an enhancement which cannot remain solitary: she
wants to utterly dominate Dan. She seduces him into drinking again, drugs him, throws
him on the bed and rapes him. This is the "confirmation of what she truly was ... Crass
isn't it? The idea that being able to fuck Dan, actually penetrate him somehow made
Carol aggressive, made her a rapist ... Crass, but true" (p. 128). Dan dies from alcohol
poisoning and head injuries; in a spiteful, manipulative and immoral resolution, Carol

frames their holier-than-thou Alcoholics Anonymous buddy for the rape and murder of
her husband.
At the climax of the tale, the strange storyteller triumphantly declares that he/she is Carol,
who, having been through "such a splendidly original and entire metamorphosis [is] wellplaced for further theatricals" (p. 138) and proceeds to rape the narrator. In time with his
thrusting into the narrator Carol asks "Do-you-seek-to- rearrange-things?" (p. 143)
raising the questions of who is rearranging what: Carol's sex and gender are rearranged,
as are her power relations with the narrator. Invoking "rearrangement" implies that there
is a natural order of things which, ironically, Carol's physical being has already violated.
The narrator's subject position is feminized through rape and insults, and he feels that to
go to the police would invite aspersions concerning his dress, his sexual orientation, and
his foolishness in venturing out "into the fictional night alone" (p. 144). So in "Cock: a
novelette" we are presented with a woman who becomes male, who rapes a man who is
feminized by the scenario: the story thus contains multiple disruptions across sex/body
and gender/subjectivity polarities, troubling the reassurances of each.
In Self's second novella, "Bull: a farce", we are presented with the rugged,
hypermasculine, rugby playing, beer drinking though sexually insecure protagonist,
ironically named "Bull," who develops a rogue vagina overnight in the pit of his knee.
We are given no explanation for this, except the preposterous notion that it could have
been caused by the joke of the genitalia- obsessed comedian, Razza Rob ("'Whaddya call
a man with a count in the back of his leg?' ... `Fucked if I know, but any port in a storm,
eh, old chep?"' [p. 1701]) Bull consults his doctor, Alan Margoulies, for a diagnosis of
the wound or infection he initially believes his new genitals to be. The sexually attractive,
somewhat effeminate, self- important doctor is a "dedicated truffler" (p. 163-4), in
constant search of an idealized "warm young snatch ... that had yet to be punched from
within by a baby's head" (p. 164), which categorically excludes his wife's. Bull has a
simultaneously pragmatic and childlike faith in medicine and doctors: he has a desperate
need for diagnosis and "getting the appropriate treatment" (p.187). Alan "reveals" the
truth of Bull's vagina to him, but only when the former's desire to fuck Bull has made
itself all too clear to the doctor's consciousness. Alan's seduction of Bull at a moment
when the latter wants "the dry, sensible touch of a doctor" (p. 230) is presented as a
compulsive but self- conscious transgression of medical ethics, and leads to an ongoing
affair which is broken only when Alan (inevitably) goes back to his wife, once the
novelty of Bull's vagina wears off.
Bull is described as becoming increasingly feminine, without consciousness or volition,
throughout the tale. When Alan "diagnoses" Bull's vagina, Bull understood it all.
Understood the feelings of vulnerability that had been troubling him all day; understood
the difficulties he had had in analysing the sensations that the wound, or burn, had
provoked in him; understood Alan's behavior in the health centre. But worse, far worse,
Bull understood certain deep and painful things about himself that had always shamed
him. (p 227)

Thus the fragilities of and ruptures within Bull's robust masculinity are revealed to him in
that moment. This is confirmed by the experience of being fucked by Alan as both
emasculating and strangely pleasurable: Bull felt violated, traduced, seduced,
bamboozled, subjugated, entrapped and enfolded. He felt his capacity for action
surgically removed. He felt, for the first time in his life, that his sense of himself as a
purposeful automaton, striding on the world's stage, had been vitiated by a warm wash of
transcendence. (p. 234)
Afterwards, Bull feels for Alan, not love, but dependency. His subsequent depression and
needy machinations about the possibilities of a continuing affair with Alan turn out to be
symptoms of pre-menstrual syndrome, confirming that Bull's female "apparatus" is fully
functional. Bull struggles with the integration of the knowledge of his "radically
independent gender" (p. 276). Faced with two disembodied model legs - one in a sports
shop, the other in a neighboring pharmacy - Bull notices that where one is coded as
masculine, "poised and virile" (p. 260), surrounded by "trusses, socks, workmanlike
garters, headbands, shirts, shorts and more socks" (p. 261), the other "was a sales display
for tights and other feminine impedimenta" (p. 260). Bull asks himself "But which one is
mine ... Who am I?" (p. 261). The answer, of course, is neither, since on the one hand the
masculine integrity of his male leg has been compromised by the appearance of female
genitals and on the other hand his leg is not female either, because the feminization of his
body "marks" the very leg itself, which is supposed to be sexually encoded by other
means, by appropriately "feminine impedimenta."
On later discovering his pregnancy, Bull does not commit suicide, as implied, but
displays surprising resilience which, ironically, is a result of his increasing femininity,
and goes to San Francisco to have "his and Alan's love-child" (p. 309). This is a boy, with
whom Bull settles down in Wales, running a sports and memorabilia shop, the
merchandise of which perhaps alludes to the remaining combination of masculinity
(sports) and femininity (memorabilia). Bull is ultimately recuperated into normality, and
while there is no mention of genital resolution, he remains, or becomes again, a man.
Both "Cock" and "Bull" challenge the fixity of sex and gender, but to what extent does
this compromise essentialist notions of femininity and masculinity? While the stories
represent mutations or developments of genitals independent of an "original" sex, both
insist on some identity or temperamental features which correspond to the physical
change. This implies an essentialist model: while the body may change, challenging the
idea that sex is given, fixed and lifelong, the psyche must necessarily change in tandem
with the defining sexual characteristics, suggesting a natural correspondence between
body and subjectivity. Even in Bull's case, where his vagina need not compromise his
still-intact penis, it is his blossoming femininity which achieves ascendancy. And while
his increasing feminization is represented as a weakness, it is also shown ultimately to
have done him good, compared with Carol's malevolent masculinity. Thus, not only is
femininity yoked with the vagina and masculinity with the penis, these characteristics are
doubly encoded with a moral value: femininity necessarily induces gentleness, and
masculinity an amoral will to dominate. However, in terms of the subjective self-esteem
of the characters, Self implies that masculinity is an enhancement, an empowerment,

even if it is a destructive, immoral one; femininity threatens masculine integrity, and as
such is a diminishment of the self, even while it has a socially integrating effect.
Along with the representation of genitals as having some necessary psychic
correspondence, issues of masculinity and femininity are also closely allied with
homosexuality. In "Cock," Carol had a somewhat unsavory lesbian relationship prior to,
and within, her marriage to Dan. As a "man" Carol seems to have a fascination with and
desire for gay sex (specifically buggery) even while she/he includes homosexuals in a list
of hated groups. Her/his homoerotic experiences both as a woman and as a "man"
inscribe her/him as doubly, inversely transgressive, first as a lesbian and secondly as a
gay "man." Bull, alternatively, is initially represented as relentlessly heterosexual, but in
the crisis of realizing his feminizing predicament, reconsiders his history as he "joined
the dots of memory and saw the sketchy picture of his latent femininity emerge from a
myriad of locker-room blushes and missed emotional connections..." (p. 228). In sexual
relations with Alan, Bull is profoundly feminized, and while the homoerotic component
of this sex is (guiltily) enjoyed by both, it is suppressed beneath the normalcy of
"heterosexual" intercourse between them.
Overall, Self's exploration of sex and gender mutability is not a utopian dream of equality
and wholeness, it is instead a world of perversity, duplicity and moral compromise. His
characters do not transcend the narrow limits of ascribed sex and gender to achieve a
liberated state of human wholeness; rather, one set of gender limitations are replaced or,
at least, modified by a second, equally limited array of possibilities. As such, his novellas
raise questions about what a representation of an idyllic non-gender-limited human may
look like, by suggesting that alongside a fantasy of a non-gendered society lies a reality
of an, arguably, inherently alienated, gender dichotomized, sex-divided social structure.
"Agnes" and Bornstein: Testimonies of lived experience
It would be possible to argue that the contradictions and recuperations of Self's novellas
are a product of his working within a literary genre. However, two accounts of lived
experiences (from very different historical moments and perspectives) raise similar
contradictions around the conundrum of mutable sex and gender. The first (Garfinkel,
1967) documents the case of "Agnes," who applied for sex reassignment surgery at
UCLA to make her a "real" woman; the second is an autobiographical account by a postoperative male-to-female transsexual and political activist (Bornstein, 1994). Agnes is "a
nineteen- year-old girl raised as a boy whose female measurements of 38-25-38 were
accompanied by a fully developed penis and scrotum" (p. 117).' Garfinkel argues that the
cultural ascription of gender is "rigorously dichotomized into the 'natural,' ie. moral,
entities of male and female" (p. 116, emphasis in the original). Transgressions of that
dichotomy are thus regarded as immoral acts, in and of themselves; that immorality must
therefore be included in the society's perception of the person, who will consequently be
punished. Garfinkel is concerned to allow the benevolent hand of psychiatry and
medicine both to help unfortunate transsexuals to reassimilate into society as their chosen
gender, and to educate broader society towards greater tolerance.

Using Agnes' case, Garfinkel attempts to show that "passing," where the transsexual aims
to maintain a coherent public persona as their "elected sex status" (p. 118), requires
constant effort to sustain because of the "omnirelevance of sexual statuses to affairs of
daily life as an invariant but unnoticed background in the texture of relevances that
comprise the changing actual scenes of everyday life." (p. 118) The effort of passing
meant that Agnes "was self-consciously equipped to teach normals how normals make
sexuality happen in commonplace settings as an obvious, familiar, recognizable, natural,
and serious matter of fact" (p. 186, emphasis added). Agnes, therefore, is in a unique
position to recognize - and perform - "appropriately" sexed social behavior. However,
neither Agnes nor Garfinkel address the ontological issues of gender identity; both fail to
address where Agnes' sexual identity may originate, and instead choose to trust the
"evidence" of her "large, well-developed breasts" (p. 119) as proof enough of her
femininity. Agnes reportedly saw her case as one of "natural error" (p. 127) which
surgeons could quite legitimately repair: in her view, she was entitled to a vagina, since
nature had swindled her out of one. She valued her breasts as "essential insignia" of
femaleness and was adamant that she had "always been a girl" (p. 128). Garfinkel
emphasizes that Agnes' hyperfemininity was not a choice, in that Agnes was not able to
switch gender roles with any ease (let alone desire). He concludes that while there was no
"natural" feminine identity to accompany Agnes' "essential insignia" of femaleness
(breasts), only by knowing and practicing the "art" of femininity in a coherent, stable and
credible way, can the impression of femaleness be managed in the outside world.
Bornstein (1994) provides a very different account from Garfinkel's of the choice to
disrupt the gender identity ascribed to morphological sex: declared a boy at birth, she
struggled with this ascription for thirty years, and ultimately underwent male-to-female
transsexual surgery. In contrast to Agnes, whose concern was to pass as a "real" woman
as convincingly as possible, Bornstein's project is to use her body as a site upon which to
challenge the assumptions about the natural immutabilities of gender at both the physical
and subjective levels. She argues that "there are as many truthful experiences of gender as
there are people who think they have a gender" (p. 8), raising the question of what it
might mean to be, or identify as, a man or a woman. "I know I am not a man - about that
much I am very clear, and I've come to the conclusion that I am probably not a woman
either, at least not according to a lot of people's rules on this sort of thing" (p. 8).
Contrasting with Agnes' concern with successfully passing, Bornstein perceives her selfrepresentation prior to her sex reassignment surgery as marked by lies and secrets, and
her change of sex as an act of honesty. On deciding to undertake the surgery she was
advised to make up a past as a little girl in order to present a credible persona to the world
as an "authentic" woman. "Here I was, taking a giant step toward personal integrity by
entering therapy with the truth and self-acknowledgment that I was transsexual, and I was
told 'don't tell anyone you're a transsexual"' (p. 62). Bornstein was committed to avoiding
the safe resolution of passing as a "real" woman; from the time of her conversion, her
project was to exist in a space of not-male, of challenging the very notion of both
maleness and femaleness, of masculinity and femininity, by eluding recruitment into
either camp.

Bornstein is thus concerned to radically dislocate sex, gender and the apparent
naturalness of difference. A paradox in her work, however, is this: if there is no necessary
correspondence between gender and bodily sex, did she need to have surgery in order to
divest herself of an identification with maleness? If one can invest one's identity with
qualities of femininity and masculinity (or even qualities which are yoked to neither
polarity) irrespective of genitalia, surely it would not matter whether Bornstein continued
to possess a penis. When asked this at a lecture at the University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, she responded that although she had enjoyed having a penis, she wanted to
know what it was like to have a vagina; what was surgically possible she then chose,
rather than using the rationalization of needing surgery to rectify "natural error" of being
a "woman trapped in a man's body". Secondly, she implied that while she had a penis she
could not know what it was like to be without one. But this turns us back to a potentially
essentialist binarism: it seems that it would not have been possible for Bornstein to have
both a vagina and a penis, and still experience herself as not-male. At the level of the
body, it seems, one still needs to choose one's sex: we may transgress across the
boundary from one to the other, but cannot remain equally situated in each, or neither,
sex. "S/he" may be a linguistic possibility, but not a bodily one, at least not yet. Sexual
subjectivities: problems and possibilities
In the works of Self, Garfinkel and Bornstein, we thus have not one fictional
representation of gender change and two real ones, but three different struggles with the
complex relations between sex and gender. In Self's "Cock & Bull" we are presented with
two (more or less) innocent victims of a particularly perverse natural disaster, which
profoundly destablilizes the gendered subjectivity of each character, though
(interestingly) not only as a result of interactions with the outside world (both Carol and
Bull pass without too many problems) but rather, as an inherent result of their shifting
biological, sexual reality. The relationship between sexed genitals and masculinity or
femininity is presented as straightforward: one becomes what one "naturally" is, where
natural is defined by genitals, even those in a far-from-conventional place on the body.
This contrasts with the work of Garfinkel (1967) and Bornstein (1994), where the
relationship between the body and identity is far more problematic. Bornstein, in
particular, presents a radical constructionist model of identity, arguing that there is no
necessary correspondence between physical and psychic gender. Both Bornstein and
Garfinkel fail to address, however, what it means to reject the physical manifestations of
a sexed self; why is the body experienced as anathema to psychic reality? While there
may not be any natural correspondence between sex and gender, given the absolute
distinctions made in our culture between the binary opposites of the feminine female and
the masculine male, the only routes available to Agnes and Bornstein, as well as Self's
protagonists, was to maintain an integrity between the physical and the psychic, that is,
between sex and gender.
In both essentialist and constructionist analyses of gender, the relationship implied
between identity and the body is that the body accurately reflects the sexed identity,
whether this reflection is "natural" or a fabrication necessary in order to function in a sexdichotomized culture. This does not address the question of "'core gender identity"'

(Garber p. 101), either in relation to transsexuals or, importantly, in a wider cultural
context: "is their [transsexuals'] gendered subjectivity mimicry, or a 'real one'? What
would 'real' and 'mimic' mean in the cultural milieu in which all gender roles are
constructed?" (Garber, 1992, p. 101). Garber argues that discourses which endorse
surgery and hormone treatment as "'solutions' to gender undecidability" (p. 102)
effectively function as a "new essentialism" (p. 108) where the body is changed to fix
gender - here "fix" implies both to "make right" and to "make stable". Indeed, Irvine
(1990) argues that in a post-1960s era of increasing flexibility of gender roles, with its
accompanying anxieties, the medico- psychiatric category "transsexualism" has gained
popularity and sex reassignment surgery has become routine. The creation of "gender
dysphoria" as diagnosable disorder "allow[s] for the distancing of cultural conflict and
signaled that gender diversity was not a collective problem requiring society to confront
rigid stereotypes and inequality; it was the dilemma of individuals with a dysfunction" (p.
260).
Similarly, Kotz (1992) introduces Judith Butler as someone who both argues that gender
transgressions can be profoundly subversive, but "at the same time cautions against
understanding the realm of fantasy and representation as a 'domain of psychic free play'
unencumbered by relations of social power" (p. 82). Butler rejects readings of her work,
"Gender Trouble" (1990), which interpret gender performance as a kind of consumerism,
where any choice is available to anyone at any time. Gender is not a free choice, in that
"the very formation of subjects, the very formation of persons, presupposes gender..." (p.
84, emphasis in original). She argues that challenging the supposed fixities of gender by
mimicking heterosexual conventions through cross- dressing or role play is not
necessarily a political act; "for a copy to be subversive of heterosexual hegemony it has
to both mime and displace its conventions" (p. 84, emphasis added). She uses the
example of Livingston's film "Paris is Burning" (1991) to show how the actions and
aspirations of the young disenfranchised male transvestites potentially both reinvest
gender ideals and endorse their hegemonic power.
In resisting notions of the naturalness of gender, that is, inevitable forms of social and
sexual behavior which depend upon an unproblematic notion of biological sex,
transsexuals may challenge the constructedness of gender identities, inviting others to
engage with the artifactual status of gender. However, this raises significant questions
regarding the political status of transsexualism: on the one hand, some transsexuals may
seek allegiances with transvestites and others involved in the political action of
"genderfuck"; on the other hand, the underlying disparity between physical sex and the
subjectively sexed "self' which transsexuals (in many cases) seek to resolve through sex
reassignment surgery, may reinstate a notion of essential sexual identity. This paradox,
therefore, arises between the liberatory and the normative potentials of transsexualism in
relation to ideas of "natural" sex difference and appropriate sexual socialization.As long
as two sexes are ascribed unique and exclusive genders, the need to transgress their
division will be necessary, if not, in certain circumstances, encouraged. While the
sex/gender alliance is so rigidly enforced, disciplining discourses such as medicine,
psychiatry and sexology would rather endorse a "natural" integrity of the body in order to
maintain a consistent, even though (surgically) constructed, association between female

and feminine, and male and masculine. However, at least theoretically, it would be
possible to conceptualize a model in which such extreme and risky procedures would not
even be relevant. Grosz(1994) argues that "bodies can be represented or understood not
as entities in themselves or simply on a linear continuum with its polar extremes occupied
by male and female bodies (with the various gradations of the 'intersexed' individuals in
between) but as a field, a two dimensional continuum in which race (and possibly even
class, caste, or religion) form body specifications...." (p. 19-20). Grosz, therefore,
attempts to dislocate binary oppositions of gender, instead situating bodies in complex,
multilayered systems of constitution which allow for greater diversity and flexibility.'
This disruption of systems of bodily organization could be compatible with Foucault's
(1978) aspirations for sexualities which shift existing power relations. If dominant
discursive practices currently control people within the social body across gender (among
other) divisions, in part through the regulation of desire and sexuality, dismantling some
of those divisions may also necessitate exploring different notions of pleasure. Perhaps
this would be compatible with Foucault's call to arms to counter the grips of power with
the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges, in their multiplicity and their possibility
of resistance. The rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality
ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures. (p.157)
It may be possible to envision a state of affairs where sex and gender are not indissolubly
joined; where both could be conceived of as mutable and relational; where sexual
possibilities would be defined, not by opposites, but according to a more fluid idea of
sexual variation; and where the pleasures of the body would not necessarily be yoked to
currently enforced and eroticized sexual practices. While this type of sexual anarchy has
its appeals, it also poses daunting challenges to some our most precious identities: those
of us who identify as lesbian, gay or heterosexual would have some rethinking to do. It
also potentially threatens the premises of much feminist analysis which relies upon
tangible, identifiable differences (albeit constructed ones) in both sex and gender as a
basis for theory. What would it mean to be a feminist in a post-gendered world? To what
would we turn to structure an analysis of power? If Butler's (1993) premise that
subjectivity itself is predicated upon gender (and thus, I would add, a consistent
relationship with sex), it is difficult to imagine from what stuff the sense of self would be
made. Or would the western notion of `the self' as a logocentric, individualized and
solitary entity (Chang, 1996) also be forced to change?
The consistency of the relationship between sex and gender in the accounts of Self,
Garfinkel and Bornstein - even despite the gap in time and political developments
between them - attests perhaps to an ongoing attachment to the comforts of the sexual
order, even while we lament its strictures. Perhaps the dark humor of Self's "Cock &
Bull" reminds us that the psychic and social determinations of gender remain irresistible,
even when the possibilities of the sexed body are, in theory, open. Notes
1. Throughout this paper, I use "sex" and "gender" as distinct terms, where "sex" refers to
a naming of babies at birth, as female or male, according to their possession of a vulva or
penis. In the case of babies with indistinct genitals, the ascribed sex corresponds to the
form the genitals are surgically "resolved" to be. "Gender," alternatively, refers to the

social and behavioral qualities which are tied to ascribed sex and which we most
familiarly refer to as femininity and masculinity.
2. It is interesting to note that alongside the perverse mutability of gender in "Cock and
Bull," race remains fixed: this suggests a greater comfort with - and erotic potential of fantasizing gender shifts in a way that comparable shifts arcs racial lines would present
far too great a threat to the status quo of white privilege.
3. Note the way of marking Agnes' body as feminine, that is, by invoking the "vital
statistics" of beauty pageants.
4. In the appendix to this chapter, Garfinkel related that a number of years after Agnes'
surgery, she revisited the UCLA clinic and "with the greatest of casualness" (p. 287)
revealed that she had taken her mother's estrogen pills from age twelve, which had given
her the secondary sexual characteristics of a female and suppressed the development of
male secondary characteristics.
5. A less delimited system of social relations potentially produces a fragmentation of
groups who may otherwise organize as political allies around broader agenda (e.g.
feminism, lesbian and gay activism, and so on). While this may be a risk, it could also be
argued that the rigid demarcations of gender, race, class, sexuality and age, among others,
is ultimately more fragmenting and alienating than a more fluid model of identity and
belonging could ever be. References
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